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MINOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPORTANCE
DAVID

N.

ATKINSON*

When President Cleveland appointed Melville W. Fuller Chief
Justice of the United States in 1888, the latter found himself more
than slightly awed by his associates on the Court. Shortly after his
confirmation by the Senate, in a moment of candor and self-analysis,
the Chief Justice regretfully concluded: "[n]o rising sun for me with
these old luminaries blazing away with all their ancient fires."' Fuller
recognized that, as is natural with any collegial institution, some
members will be denied the stature and preeminence attained by
others.
The great majority of those appointed to the Supreme Court
are minor Justices, leaving no special imprint on the public mind.
They are nonetheless worthy of intensive study. This is especially
true since the Court functions as a collective instrument of government, neither as centralized as the Presidency nor as diffused as
Congress. Most Justices have been without distinguishing originality,
but even the least eminent Justice has had the opportunity to participate in the development of judicially formulated public policy. As
Justice Holmes observed: "what the world pays for is judgment, not
'' 2
the original mind.

Stature is an elusive concept, and it is admittedly a difficult task
to rank Supreme Court Justices on a scale of accomplishment.3 "Assessment of distinction in the realm of the mind and spirit cannot exclude
subjective factors," Justice Felix Frankfurter has reminded us. "Yet
it is as true of judges as of poets or philosophers that whatever may
be the fluctuations in what is called the verdict of history, varying
and conflicting views finally come to rest and there arises a consensus

* Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-Kansas City. B.A., M.A.,
J.D., Ph.D., University of Iowa.
1. W. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER 127 (1967).
2. THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 385 (M. Lerner ed. 1943).
3. See Blaustein & Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A.J. 1183, 118789 (1972). Even with this obstacle, the idea of major and minor Justices continues to
fascinate. A panel of 65 scholars selected by Professors Blaustein and Mersky picked
John Marshall, Joseph Story, Roger B. Taney, John Marshall Harlan I, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Charles Evans Hughes, Louis D. Brandeis, Harlan F. Stone, Benjamin N.
Cardozo, Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Earl Warren as the "greatest" Justices.
Id. at 1183. James C. McReynolds, James F. Byrnes, and Charles F. Whittaker were
at the bottom of the "failures" list. Id. at 1185-87.
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of informed judgment." 4 Certain criteria have been traditionally
recognized as aids in determining judicial accomplishment. Of course,
universal agreement on these matters is not possible.5 But even when
legitimate variations in judgment are allowed, it is possible to distinguish those Justices who have earned special distinction on the
bench from those whose accomplishments have been more modest.
One status criterion may be opinion output. Here longevity of
service is apt to be signally important. Most would agree that Stephen
J. Field, by virtue of the tenacity and force with which he held to his
conclusions and pressed his point of view for 34 years, is entitled to
a place of preeminence in Supreme Court history.6 Not only did he
participate in hundreds of major decisions, but he elaborated his views
in the detail permitted only by long service. The duration of his
tenure as well as his strength of mind made him influential. Justice
Frankfurter named only one Justice (Benjamin N. Cardozo) who had
served for less than one decade among the 12 members of the Court
he imagined would be included by general consensus "in the roster
of distinction. ' ' 7 James F. Byrnes, who stayed on the Supreme Court
only one term before resigning to become the Director of Economic
Stabilization, is one whose contribution was more negligible than
8
most because of his brief tenure.
For the vast majority of Justices whose tenures are neither overly
long nor unduly short, signed opinions assume an added significance.
The type of opinions which such Justices are assigned may have an important bearing on any evaluation of their contribution, since not all
of the cases which come before the Supreme Court are equally signifi4. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781,
783 (1957).
5. Chief Justice Taney's reputation is a classic illustration. Writing in 1937, Professor Frankfurter concluded: "The devastation of the Civil War for a long time
obliterated the truth about Taney. And the blaze of Marshall's glory will permanently
overshadow him. But the intellectual power of his opinions and their enduring contribution to a workable adjustment of the theoretical distribution of authority between
two governments for a single people, place Taney second only to Marshall in the
constitutional history of our country." F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 72-73 (1937).
6. As Robert G. McCloskey observed: "From John Marshall to Hugo Black the
judges who have played the primary creative parts in building our constitutional law
have been more like Field than like the Mephistophelean model Holmes recommended. . . . For better or worse, it is judges like Field who have left the deepest imprint
on the history of the nation." McCloskey, Introduction to C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD:
CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW at xix (1969).
7. Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 783. Although his tenure was short, Justice Cardozo
served during an especially crucial period in Court history. See Atkinson, Mr. Justice
Cardozo and the New Deal: An Appraisal, 15 VILL. L. REV. 68 (1969).
8. See J. BYRNES, ALL IN ONE LIFETIME (1956). But see Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (Court's opinion written by Byrnes, J.).
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cant at the time of decision or thereafter, even though a Justice may
accord all cases which come before him equal respect and attention. 9
Not all opinions are of equal precedential importance in the subsequent resolution of social conflict. An interpretation of a tax statute,
for example, is likely to settle the specific issue raised by the litigants,
until Congress enacts a change in the Internal Revenue Code. 10 The
interpretation will affect all parties whose financial decisions or tax
returns involve issues identical to the one litigated. But the scope of
the opinion wherein the interpretative decision is made is decidedly
limited. It affects only those persons who encounter an extremely
circumscribed set of circumstances; as a precedent the opinion is without wide social importance inasmuch as it has limited application to
one relatively narrow tax issue.
Conversely, an opinion elaborating the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the fourth amendment
has broad social implications. There is a uniqueness about each constitutional case; significant legal distinctions may rest on small
differences in factual patterns. 1 The circumstances of the search, the
behavior of the police, and the conduct of the accused offer interminable variations which may, in turn, provide a basis for distinguishing
the case from others raising approximately the same questions. Nonetheless, an opinion involving searches and seizures is distinguishable
from an opinion involving the interpretation of a tax statute. The
former will be examined repeatedly for precedential value, whereas
the latter, a nonconstitutional matter, will not likely be attributed
significance beyond the specific circumstances of the case.
Hence the subject matter of a Justice's opinions is exceedingly important; posterity will, in part, judge him by the broad social significance of the issues to which his opinions speak. It is, however, important to note the limited control individual Justices have over the
assignment of majority opinions. 2 Assignments are the prerogative
of the Chief Justice whenever he is in the majority. When the Chief
Justice is in the minority, this choice falls to the senior Justice in
the majority. A Chief Justice may, therefore, maintain his control
9. In a letter of May 11, 1951, Justice Harold H. Burton wrote to Justice Sherman
Minton: "When I referred to having sent in all the 'big circulations' before I left on
Wednesday, I was not referring to circulations of opinions. They are all big to me.
I was referring to the big circulated records in the capital cases which came
to me on Wednesday P.M." Letter from Justice Harold Burton to Justice Sherman
Minton, May 11, 1951, on file in Harry S. Truman Library.
10. See E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6-8 (1968).
11. See Kort, Quantitative Analysis of Fact-Patterns in Cases and Their Impact on
judicial Decisions, 79 HA ,v. L. REv. 1595 (1966).
12. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 200-19 (2d ed. 1968).
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over the opinion-writing function by remaining within the majority
bloc. 1" He may assign relatively few socially significant cases to a
Justice because of the Justice's infirmity,1' general indolence, 15 or
failure to perform within the time limitations imposed by the Court's
schedule .' Thus a Chief Justice's assessment of a Justice's performance
will affect the types of opinions assigned to the Justice.
Of course, a Justice, if denied the opportunity to speak for the
majority, may always concur in a separate opinion. Justice Frankfurter's inclination to concur separately in majority opinions
(stemming from his long held belief in the desirability of seriatim
opinions, the practice of English judges) put him in fundamental disagreement with those who favor institutional unanimity whenever
possible.1 7 Dissenting opinions may also be written at will and can
13. Chief Justice Marshall, according to W. W. Crosskey, "did not carry on a
continual frontal assault, uniformly successful, upon the subversive principles of
Jeffersonianism. Instead, he fought a long and stubborn rearguard action to defend
the Constitution against those principles. And it was, on the whole, a losing fight." Even
though he retained control over the power of assignment, the Chief Justice frequently
was "forced into compromise or defeat." Crosskey, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in MR.
JusTIcE 3, 24-25 (rev. ed. A. Dunham & P. Kurland 1964).
14. For a discussion of the last days of Justice Field, see W. KING, supra note 1, at
222-23. Justice Joseph McKenna's retirement is poignantly described in Danelski, A
Supreme Court Justice Steps Down, 54 YALE REv. 411 (1965). See also Fairman, The
Retirement of Federal Judges, 51 HARV. L. REV. 397 (1938).
15. See Letter from Justice William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 10, 1822,
in D. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 181-82 (1954). Justice Johnson's rationalization
of why Chief Justice Marshall wrote most of the opinions of the Court was not flattering:
"Cushing was incompetent. Chase could not be got to think or write-Patterson [sic]
was a slow man and willingly declined the trouble, and the other two judges you know
are commonly estimated as one judge." Id. at 182. Justice Johnson's explanation of
the situation, however, may not be entirely accurate. See J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME
COURT: ITS POLITIcs, PERSONALITIES, AND PROCEDURES 111 (1960).
16. According to Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Van Devanter "was slow in getting
out his opinions, having what one of his most intimate friends in the Court (Justice
Sutherland) described as 'pen paralysis.' This difficulty increased with the years. But
his careful and elaborate statements in conference, with his accurate review of authorities,
were of the greatest value." THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EvANs HUGHES
171 (D. Danelski & J. Tulchin eds. 1973). Between 1930 and 1936 Justice Van Devanter
wrote "only twenty-two opinions, while during the same period the Court wrote a
total of 963 opinions, and Brandeis, Hughes, Roberts, Stone and Cardozo averaged about
twenty each, every year." D. PEARSON & R. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 187 (1937). Justice
Van Devanter wrote five opinions in 1930, one each in 1931 and 1932, nine in 1933, three
in 1934, none in 1935, and three in 1936. Id.
17. A revealing exchange of correspondence occurred between Chief Justice Fred
Vinson and Justice Frankfurter on the desirability of institutional unanimity. On
December 1, 1948, Chief Justice Vinson wrote:
[I]t is hard to believe that multiple opinions in the early days of this Court,
or the English practice, are our controlling precedents, nor is there anything in
what I said or what I think that should or could convey to you any impression
that "conscientious opinions courteously expressed, whether for the Court, in
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enhance a Justice's reputation, as in the case of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes.' More commonly, however, a dissenting role is, as Justice
19
Jackson suggested, an admission of defeat.
A Justice must usually have the opportunity to write opinions for
the Court's majority in significant cases if his work is to acquire
special distinction. Beyond this primary requirement, he must be
able to deal with constitutional issues with imagination and with a
sense of their current importance to the public. There must be an
awareness, partly intuitive, partly a product of education, of the larger
values sometimes only implicitly suggested in litigation." There is
concurrence, or in dissent" should not be the order of the day. But, I do feel
that the Bench, the Bar and the public generally have a right to be critical of
the many opinions that sometimes appear in the disposition of cases. I know
that the Bench and Bar have great difficulty, at times, in knowing what to do
when we get through with some cases.
Letter from Chief Justice Fred Vinson to Justice Felix Frankfurter, Dec. 1, 1948, on file in
Library of Congress.
Justice Frankfurter offered his rebuttal on the following day:
Somehow or other all the other English-speaking nations seem to survive with
the expression of individual views in almost every case. And I adhere to the
view which Jefferson so convincingly expressed that were it possible to dispose
of the business of the Court and to express individual views on constitutional
issues that would be most desirable. But, in any event, bench and bar and the
public generally have "a right to be critical" but their criticism is well-founded
only if the quality of opinions is below the appropriate standard for this Court,
whether in substance or in temper, or if opinions are merely repetitive.
If there is one thing that the history of this Court proves, it is that very
little attention should be paid to the ephemeral griping of an uninformed
laity and, too often, of an unlearned or narrowly preoccupied bar.
Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Fred Vinson, Dec. 2, 1948, on
file in Library of Congress.
18. See THE DISSENTING OPINIONS OF MIR. JUSTICE HOLMES (A. Lief ed. 1929). Greatness has been found to be highly correlated with frequent dissent. "The reason for
the strength of the relation partly lies in the fact that those judges who are most
remembered as dissenters are those who had the foresight or fortune to have their
dissenting positions eventually become majority positions." Nagel, Characteristics of
Supreme Court Greatness, 56 A.B.A.J. 957, 959 (1970).
19. "Each dissenting opinion is a confession of failure to convince the writer's colleagues, and the true test of a judge is his influence in leading, not in opposing, his
court." R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
19 (1963).
20. Judge Learned Hand expressed this need with his customary eloquence:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass on
a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with
Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante,
Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato,
Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which have been specifically written
on the subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he
approaches the questions before him. The words he must construe are empty
vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not gather
figs of thistles, nor supply institutions from judges whose outlook is limited
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no doctrinal or ideological point of view more serviceable in this
respect than another. In the nineteenth century Justices Samuel F.
Miller and Stephen J. Field disagreed with an intellectual intensity
similar to contemporary disagreements between Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo L. Black. 2 1 Few would deny that all four are among
the greatest Justices. These Justices possessed consciously developed
sets of values that they sought to implement within the framework of
constitutional adjudication. Their philosophical and systematic approaches to constitutional issues were beyond the capability or inclination of most of their colleagues. The great majority of Supreme
Court Justices-the minor Justices-have contented themselves with
ad hoc adjudications of constitutional issues.
Fortuitous circumstances may influence a Justice's status in constitutional history. One who, like Chief Justice Marshall, serves
during a period of national growth or judicial activism has maximum
opportunity to formulate doctrines of lasting social significance. 22 The
Supreme Court has known periods of consolidation and of cautious
reinterpretation, as old themes become less urgent or even extinct
3
and new kinds of questions begin to attract the Court's attention.2
Those who sit during these periods of judicial weakness have less
opportunity to influence the nation's course.
Another criterion for judging members of the Court is style;
that is, the manner in which views are conveyed. 24 Forceful expression,
felicitous phrasing, and cogent, logical analysis, as well as occasional
studied understatement, may contribute to the impact of the final
product. 25 Most Justices are without the force of John Marshall or
by parish or class. They must be aware that there are before them more than
verbal problems; more than final solutions cast in generalizations of universal
applicability. They must be aware of the changing social tensions in every society
which make it an organism; which demand new schemata of adaptation; which
will disrupt it, if rigidly confined.
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 81 (1. Dilliard ed. 1960).
21. Compare C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890
(1939) (discussing issues that divided Justices Miller and Field), with W. MENDELSON,
JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (2d ed. 1966) (discussing
issues that divided Justices Black and Frankfurter).
22. As Justice Holmes trenchantly put it: "A great man represents a great ganglion
in the nerves of society, or, to vary the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of
history, and part of his greatness consists in his being there." THE MIND AND FAITH OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 383 (M. Lerner ed. 1943).
23. See, e.g., C. PRITCHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948).
24. For a discussion of judicial style, see J. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME
LIFE 130-43, 295-302 (1968).
25. Chief Justice Earl Warren was particularly sensitive to considerations of style
in segregation cases. On May 7, 1954, the Chief Justice circulated a memorandum among
the Justices in which he indicated his belief as to how the final opinions should be
COURT IN AMERICAN
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Robert H. Jackson, the mastery of language of Oliver Wendell Holmes
or Benjamin N. Cardozo, or the analytic facility of Joseph Story or the
second John Marshall Harlan. A Justice's style may set him apart
from his associates and add distinction to his point of view, since
style affects the efficacy of communication.
A final criterion in assessing a Justice's performance relates to
intra-Court socialization patterns, particularly those affecting internal
work patterns. 26 Because the Supreme Court is a collegial institution,
some Justices are certain to have more influence on their associates
than others. The available evidence indicates that Chief Justice
Marshall was acutely sensitive to the potential advantages of amiable
intra-Court relationships. 27 While Chief Justice Marshall was concerned
with consolidating and maintaining an influential position within his
Court, other Justices' intra-Court influence has saved them from the
opprobrium of near uselessness. A striking example drawn from the
present century is Willis Van Devanter, who wrote very few opinions
for the Court.28 Yet his performance in conference, where he was
invariably well-informed and verbal, added a needed dimension to
the Taft Court. Other Justices frequently relied upon his leadership
in performing the tasks of the Court. His expertise in federal jurisdiction and procedure, along with his general acumen, permitted him
to contribute significantly to the Supreme Court despite his seeming
inability to fashion opinions.
Although no one of them is necessarily conclusive, the foregoing
criteria may assist in determining a Supreme Court Justice's place or
status in Court history. Those Justices who write few opinions, who
do not speak often for the Court in landmark decisions, who do not
deal systematically with constitutional theory, who are not fortunate
in their period of service, who are not gifted in their capacity to express themselves, and who make no special unseen contribution to
the Court's work may properly be considered minor Justices. By these
criteria most of the Justices of the Supreme Court have been minor
Justices. Such a conclusion is not meant as a disparagement. Judicial
accomplishment is a relative and intangible concept, meaningful only

written. "The memos were prepared on the theory that the opinions should be
short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, nonaccusatory." Memorandum from Chief Justice Earl Warren to the Members of the
United States Supreme Court, May 7, 1954.
26. See, e.g., C. MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 251.
75 (1963); Daneiski, The Influence of the Chief Justice, in THE DECISIONAL PROCESS
IN COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITCS (2d ed. W. Murphy & C. Pritchett 1974).
27. See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 59-116 (1916).
28. See note 16 supra.
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in intra-Court comparisons. Anyone who sits on the Court has achieved
a distinction far beyond the grasp of most people.
Because Supreme Court Justices, like Presidents, constitute a very
select elite, even minor Justices should be studied. There are several
reasons for the importance of minor Justices. In the first place, each
Justice has one vote. While Justices vary in ability or energy, each has
29
equal power to affect short-term public policy with his ballot.
The institution of judicial review has permitted the Supreme Court
to achieve power unparalleled by any traditional court in the modern
world. Indeed, an appreciation of the Court's past exercise of judicial
review has caused one commentator 0 to suggest that this exercise
should be abandoned by overruling Marbury v. Madison.31 Even Professor Robert A. Dahl, who has contended that the Supreme Court inevitably reflects the dominant decisionmaking coalition in the United
States "except for short lived transitional periods when the old alliance
is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take control of
political institutions," has conceded:
It follows that within the somewhat narrow limits set by the basic
policy goals of the dominant alliance, the Court can sometimes
make national policy. Its discretion, then, is not unlike that of a
powerful committee chairman in Congress who cannot, generally
speaking, nullify the basic policies substantially agreed on by the
rest of the dominant leadership, but who can, within these limits,
often determine important questions of timing, effectiveness, and
subordinate policy. Thus the Court is least effective against a current
law-making majority-and evidently least inclined to act. It is
most effective when it sets the bounds of policy for officials, agencies,
state governments, or even regions, a task that has come to occupy
2
a very large part of the Court's business.3
Thus one reason why minor Justices are important is that each
Justice has an equal vote in the resolution of the important questions
presented to the Supreme Court. The number and kind of opinions
written, as well as the manner in which constitutional issues are treated
and the rationale used to justify conclusions, are considerations of vast
future importance in constitutional development. But at the time
29. The use to which voting data has been put is summarized, along with other
research trends, in W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW (1972).
30. T. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONINGS OF
COURTS 385

(1970).

31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
32. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE
ed. 1972).

UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE

207 (2d
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of decision Supreme Court Justices are neither distinguished nor minor;
they are equal participants in an important decisionmaking process.
Votes count most, at least in the short run. Accordingly, minor Justices
merit study because they are directly involved in the creation of na33
tional public policy.
A better understanding of the dynamics of group decisionmaking
within the Supreme Court may depend on learning more about minor
Justices. To ignore minor Justices is to risk getting a very partial
view of institutional behavior patterns. Research efforts focusing on
what in fact occurs inside the Court are still much needed. It would
be helpful to know more about (1) the professional and social interaction of Court members, (2) the Justices' attitudes toward the Supreme
Court bar, (3) the Justices' reaction to criticism, (4) their self-images,
and (5) the work patterns followed at the Court, including each
34
Justice's use of law clerks.
Moreover, biographies of minor Justices may provide a source of
valuable raw data for more systematic efforts to correlate background
characteristics of the Justices with the decisionmaking process.3 5 For
example, assuming objectivity is a goal toward which a Justice should
strive, that goal is thwarted when members of the Court are shackled
with past commitments from which they are unable to free themselves.36 Justice Miller expressed an intuitive awareness of an association between past experiences and present attitudes affecting judicial
decisionmaking when he wrote:

For a discussion of the public policy formulating role of the Supreme Court, see
THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC POLICY (1969); J. SIGLER, COURTS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1970).
34. See, e.g., Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton and Behavior Patterns Inside the
Supreme Court, 69 Nw. U.L. Rav. 716 (1974).
One possible avenue of study would rely on private Court papers and interview
data when available; many of the ablest studies to date have relied on these. For
a discussion of the roll of private papers in judicial biography, see W. MURPHY & J.
TANENHAUS, supra note 29, at 121-23. See also notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
35. See Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait,
3 MmwEST J. POL. SCI. 1 (1959). A less optimistic view of the ultimate utility of employing
socio-economic variables is expressed in T. BECKER, supra note 30, at 75-79.
36. "Judicial biographies of recent years-particularly those written by political
scientists-are based on two assumptions: that the social philosophy of the judge will
be reflected in his judicial opinions; and that his early life and experiences had a
controlling effect on the molding of the philosophy which he read into the law as a
judge." Lardner, Judges As Students of American Society, 24 IND. L.J. 386 (1949).
Judicial biographers have scarcely begun to develop psychological variables which
could be used "to provide case histories exploring the relationship between personality
and decisions." Peltason, Supreme Court Biography and the Study of Public Law, in
ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 215, 220 (G. Dietze ed. 1964).
33.

M.
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It is vain to contend with judges who have been at the bar the
advocates for forty years of railroad companies, and all the forms
of associated capital, when they are called upon to decide cases
where such interests are in contest. All their training, all their
feelings are from the start in favor of those who need no such
3 7

influence.

Justice Holmes, to offer a contrasting illustration, often spoke to
Harold Laski with disaffection about the probable effects of economic
reforms in the United States; 38 nonetheless, his open-mindedness and
lack of dogmatism permitted him to view legislative innovations
tolerantly, even though he personally might have disagreed with
them.3 9 He was, by his own admission, prepared to entertain conclusions which differed from his own preferences, thereby generally
abiding by the principle of unfettered majority rule. Detailed
biographies of minor Justices might encourage further study of the
psychological and socio-economic variables which influence their attitudes and judicial decisions. Whether Justice Miller's characterization
of some of his colleagues or Justice Holmes' self-restraint is more
representative of Court behavior is a question ripe for future research.
Thus far it has been suggested that the study of minor Justices is
important because of their impact on public policy, and because of
the need to appreciate the internal dynamics of Court decisionmaking.
Additionally, studies of minor Justices are likely to disclose information about other, better known Justices. 40 Many of the ablest
37. C. FAMMAN, supra note 21.
38. As Justice Holmes wrote to Mr. Laski on December 9, 1921:
I read your article on Christian Socialism with the pleasure I always get from your
writing, but with a touch of regret at the tone that you hint from time to time
that the existing order is wicked. The inevitable is not wicked. If you can improve upon it all right, but it is not necessary to damn the stem because you
are the flower. As it seems to me that all society has rested on the death of
men and must rest on that or on the prevention of the lives of a good many, I
naturally shrink from the moral tone.
1 HOLMES-LASKI LErrERs 385 (M. Howe ed. 1953) (footnote omitted).
39. "[Justice Holmes'] scepticism and even hostility, as a matter of private judgment, toward legislation which he was ready to sustain as a judge only serve to add
cubits to his judicial stature. For he thereby transcended personal predilections and
private notions of social policy, and became truly the impersonal voice of the Constitution." F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 44-45 (1938).
See also THE HOLMES READER (2d ed. J. Marke 1964).
40. There are, of course, many other valuable functions fulfilled by judicial
biography. Walter F. Murphy has enumerated some of the more important functions:
(1) to supply the lay reader with general knowledge about the judiciary and
its surrounding political system and to increase the knowledge of the professional,
(2) to analyze the character of the Justice and to outline the nature of the office
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biographies currently available reveal much about those with whom
the subject came frequently into association. Professor Alpheus T.
Mason's biography of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone shows that
Justice Frankfurter endlessly engaged in the most uninhibited flattery
in his correspondence with the Chief Justice; it is also clear that Chief
Justice Stone did not have a very high regard for Justice Black's legal
capabilities. 4 1 Almost incidentally, Chief Justice Stone's biography
yields valuable insights into Justice Frankfurter's style of lobbying and
Justice Black's attitude toward stare decisis.
If the thesis of this article is persuasive-that most Supreme Court
Justices are minor but still worthy of intensive study-one wonders
why more biographies than are presently available have not been
written. There are several reasons. 42 First, there have been formidable
problems surrounding the raw materials of judicial biography.
43
Justices, more so than other political elites, are shrouded in privacy.
Court papers have sometimes been destroyed, neglected, or culled
for improprieties in a manner calculated to distort the evidence in
the subject's favor. 44 Curiously enough, some scholars have even taken
the position that there is something unethical or faintly improper
about the practice of judicial biographers availing themselves of the
best evidence, including Court papers when available.4 5 Professor
Mason's response surely represents the better view:
Assuming that papers have been placed by responsible persons in
the hands of a responsible scholar, certain considerations governing
their selection may perhaps meet the demands of both privacy and
history, viz: (a) exclusion of everything that descends to the level
of mere gossip; (b) inclusion of whatever contributes to an underhe held and the uses to which he put that office, (3) to reconstruct the values
that influenced the Justice in his decisionmaking, that is, to illuminate his
jurisprudence, (4) to place the man and the institution in the context of their
times, (5) to throw light on the group phase of the Court's decisional processes,
(6) to describe at least some of the various sets of roles that the Court can play
in the political system, and (7) to provide useful data for scholars whose interest
in a particular Justice or even in the Supreme Court is only incidental.
Murphy, Book Review, 78 YALE L.J. 725, 728-29 (1969).
41. See generally A. MASON, HARLAN FIsKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 467-720 (1968).
42. See Spector, Judicial Biography and the United States Supreme Court: A
Bibliographical Appraisal, 11 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 1, 2-3 (1967).
43. One commentator suggests that this shroud is thinner than commonly supposed.
Becker, Surveys and Judiciaries, or Who's Afraid of the Purple Curtain, 1 LAw & Soc'v
REv. 133 (1966).
44. The historical papers available for each Justice and their archival location
can be found in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR
LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
45. See, e.g., Cahn, Eavesdropping on Justice, 184 THE NATION 14 (1957).
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standing of the judging process and everything of possible help
in the Court's future deliberations; (c) inclusion of such material
as appears meaningful in terms of biography. If judicial procedures,
the give and take of the conference room, the compromises that a
collective judgment inevitably entails, and the incidental revelations
of human frailties and strength, are so peculiarly immune to the
claims of history as to preclude the spadework necessary to an
understanding of the Supreme Court, the Court itself would be
46
among the losers.

Secondly, judicial biography has always been an underpopulated
subfield in social science. 47 The subject matter makes formidable demands on the scholar. Expertise is, at the minimum, required in law,
political science, history, and possibly psychology. Moreover, biography
is a literary genre, and the best judicial biographies have always
qualified as literary achievements. Unfortunately, judicial biography
requires a combination of skills not easily commanded by any one
researcher.
And finally, there has been a lack of interest by the general public
and some academics in judicial biography. This indifference has been
apparently bolstered by a belief in the obscurity of the subject matter.
But is such indifference justified? "American legal history," Justice
Frankfurter once warned, "has done very little to rescue the Court
from the limbo of impersonality. ' ' 48 Until there is a fuller awareness
of the interplay between individual personalities and decisionmaking,
it is unlikely there will be "an adequate history of the Supreme Court,
' ' 49
and, therefore, of the United States.
46.

A.
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(1968).

47. Writing in 1967, Robert M. Spector concluded: "Full-length biographies of
the ninety-five separate justices of the highest United States tribunal have been slow
a-borning. Marshall, Taney, White, Taft, Holmes, Stone, and Brandeis have been
the main centers of attraction thus far." Spector, supra note 42, at 1.
48. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 5, at 6. A contrary conclusion about the "limbo of
impersonality" is expressed by Peltason, supra note 36, at 219.
49. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 5, at 6.

